#TOR PROJECT REPLACE FRAGILE CODE WITH HOW TO#
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#TOR PROJECT REPLACE FRAGILE CODE WITH CODE#

He also had some great advice for getting through the process.ĭr. That was completely off the beaten path, and he was flexible enough to Ravi Sandhu I wanted to do a PhD dissertation My thanks go to the committee members, who were very helpful.Ī special thanks go to Dr. If you read the dissertation you should also look at theĭo not impact the fundamentals of anything in the dissertation). Includes demonstrations with GCC (to demonstrate scaleability) (now compilers don’t need to self-parent), includes formal proofs, and The dissertation generalizes the ACSAC paper The dissertation includes a section explaining how it extends

#TOR PROJECT REPLACE FRAGILE CODE WITH CODE#

The untrusted executable, then the source code accurately represents If the result is bit-for-bit identical with Parent), and then the compiler source code is compiled using the result With a second (trusted) compiler (using the source code of the compiler’s In the DDC technique, source code is compiled twice: once (3) a description of approaches for applying DDC in various real-world Lisp compiler, and a large industrial-strength C compiler, GCC), and (a small C compiler, a small Lisp compiler, a small maliciously corrupted (1) a formal proof that DDC can determine if source code and generatedĮxecutable code correspond, (2) a demonstration of DDC with four compilers Using the “Diverse Double-Compiling” (DDC) technique, as demonstrated by The trusting trust attack can be detected and effectively countered If this attack cannot be countered, attackersĬan quietly subvert entire classes of computer systems, gaining completeĬontrol over financial, infrastructure, military, and/or business Previously-known countermeasures haveīeen grossly inadequate. If this “trusting trust” attack goes undetected,Įven complete analysis of a system’s source code will not find the On Trusting Trust”), showed that compilers canīe subverted to insert malicious Trojan horses into critical software, The presentation materials are also available inįairfax, Virginia, Innovation Hall, room 105Īn Air Force evaluation of Multics, and Ken Thompson’s Turing award This presentation was given on November 23, 2009, 1-3pm Of my official public defense is also available This dissertation was accepted by my PhD committee on October 26, 2009. “trusting trust” attack by using the “Diverse Double-Compiling” (DDC)

#TOR PROJECT REPLACE FRAGILE CODE WITH HOW TO#

Is my 2009 PhD dissertation explaining how to counter the Real-world application of DDC, specificallyįully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling

#TOR PROJECT REPLACE FRAGILE CODE WITH SOFTWARE#

Software patents and application programmer interface (API) copyrights, Thankfully, I think there is an effective countermeasure, which I have namedĭetailed data (to duplicate the experiments), Up to now it’s been presumed to be the essential uncounterable attack.Įssentially since Ken Thompson publicly described it.Īfter all, if there’s a known attack that cannotīe effectively countered, should we be using computers at all?

The “Trusting Trust” attack is an incredibly nasty attack in computer security Here’s information about my work to counter the “Trusting Trust” attack. Wheeler’s Page on Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling (DDC) - Countering Trojan Horse attacks on Compilers Fully Countering Trusting Trust through Diverse Double-Compiling (DDC) - Countering Trojan Horse attacks on Compilers David A.

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